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This paper is hinting at a number of things of
great importance. However, it is itself a victim
of the 'dependency syndrome' that it attacks. The
idea that intellectual isolation on a nationalist
basis is desirable, or even essential for indepen-
dence and progress, and that the exchange of
ideas with other countries inevitably produces
domination by them, owes its intellectual force
and underpinning to somewhat notorious elements
of 19th century European thought. There is no
'German ideology', nor is there a Ceylonese
ideology. This is not to deny that developing
countries, particularly small ones, need to set up
both mechanisms and ways of thought that will
protect them against intellectually unsuitable
transfers of technology, nor that such transfers
may amount to 'dominance'. But, like protection
in the field of trade, such activities can take two
forms: the promotion of ways of doing things
better oneself (such as the development of good
doctoral studies in social sciences within Sri
Lanka), or the exclusion of outside ideas in the
hope that this will somehow permit cultural
flowering at home. 1 fear that the whole tone of
the paper is in favour of the latter solution, and
that it will not work.
There are really five separate issues, closely
connected, but unfortunately run together in this
paper. They are the extent to which Ceylonese
thinking has been unduly influenced by Western
models (and, related to this, the cultural depen-
dency of returning Ceylonese scholars who have
visited the West upon it); the operation of
foreigners and members of overseas missions in
the context of overseas 'reference groups' instead
of Ceylonese ones, and the possible consequent
damage from outsiders; the problem of 'cultural
encapsulation' of Ceylonese organizations within
Western rather than Ceylonese contexts, and their
lack of reality; the problem of the 'brain drain';
and the role of developed-country institutions and
academics vis-à-vis a small developing country.
The dominance of Western models (including of
course Marxist models) in social science is an
accident of 18th century, largely pre-colonial,
French intellectual history. The use of empirical
method, and the general principles of testing
propositions (principles which Marx usually
observed quite rigorously, by the way), are how-
ever a logical issue transcending the use of any
particular group of social science models. It is
open to scholars in the Third World to challenge
the bases of such models, and some (notably
Srinivas with his concept of 'Sanskritization')
have done so in certain fields. I do question
whether Ceylon has been unusually the slave of
'inappropriate' Western social-science models-
more so, say, than Cuba or Belgium or Italy or
Yugoslavia. Ceylon's Ten Year Plan of 1959 was
a fundamental departure in development thinking,
and its emphasis upon and analysis of the need
to relieve poverty and uuemployrnent (even at the
cost of 'growth') was far ahead of the Western
models of its time. It is true that several overseas
economists, including John Hicks and Joan
Robinson, visited Colombo because the authors
of that excellent Plan felt (for tactical or other
reasons) that Western figures were needed to
confer upon it some sort of intellectual respecta-
bility; but this is hardly relevant. Ceylon was, in
planning for employment, far ahead of the
'Western social science models' that are supposed
to have damaged it so greatly. Nor, incidentally,
do I detect much influence of 'American political
hegemony' upon Ceylonese social-scientific dis-
cussions, whether by nationals or by foreigners;
writers such as Wriggins are essentially gifted
modern historians, writing quite self-awarely
outside the technological, pseudo-neutral, numero-
cratic mainstream of modern US political science.
I suspect the fear of Western models stems from
the concern about the role of the returning
academic who has been influenced by wicked
institutions such as 1DS. I do not see either how
the relationship of Susantha and his colleagues
with IDS is one of 'cultural dependency' or how
it will damage Sri Lanka on their return. IDS,
with its substantial representation of well-varied
Marxists and structuralists at all levels, is less
likely to instil cultural conformity into its (highly
independent) visitors from Sri Lanka, than is the
environment from which they come. Indeed,
Susantha himself concedes that several of the
notions which he admires (questioning of the
market mechanism, emphasis on dependency and
so forth) originate in Western institutions. One
might add that they often stem from LDC
scholars in those institutions.
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1 pass now to the issue of 'reference groups' of
both foreign and domestic advisers within Sri
Lanka. Goonatilake underestimates both the
diversity of these groups and the extent to which
they are influenced by what they see in the coun-
tries where their members, or those referring to
then'i, work. He cannotthough he doescom-
plain both that the ideological diversity of the
ILO Mission prevented it from reaching a
fundamental political conclusion, and that it
imposed a particular .'Western' reference group
upon Sri Lanka. But there is a deeper point. All
countries need informed outside analysis of their
problems, and it is probably better for such
analysis not to be based on the cultural precon-
ceptions of the country analysed. John White's
perceptive remarks about Sri Lanka, cited by
Goonatilake, are a good illustration of this; so
is the fact that much the best report on the recent
weaknesses of the British economy, that of the
Brookings Institution, came entirely from out-
siders (so of course did the worst, that of the
Hudson Institute; but I assume that we are talking
about serious analysis). As for the receptivity of
these international missions to what is going on
in the country to which they are attached, it is
relevant to consider Goonatilake's correct ob-
servation that it was the previous UNP
government which asked the ILO to send a
team, but the semi-socialist administration of
Mrs Bandaranaike to which that team was
accredited. Many of the members of the team
would not have felt they could usefully help a
UNP government; and much time was spent
attempting to understand and absorb the value-
assumptions of the SLFP-LSSP government
before we started working on the details of the
ILO report.'
The crucial role of the outsider must be em-
phasized. It was excellent that one of the most
active and central members of the ILO team was
a Ceylonese (a specialist in land reform); but we
could not have done a decent job had we not
included as members people with experience of
many different developing countries with relevant
similarities to and differences from, Sri Lanka.
About 40 per cent of the mission members were
nationals of developing countries. I remember
with particular interest K. N. Raj's constant
(though never belittling) comparisons of the Sri
Lanka situation to that in the Indian state of
Kerala, which has many ecological similarities in
agriculture.
1 Some would say that too much time was spentindeed that
is elsewhere implied by Goonatilake, though it is hardly
consistent with criticizing foreign missions for being too
foreign
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The fundamental mistake about the role of the
foreigner is contained in the sentence, "to fit this
purpose the conceptual apparatus of the social
sciences will have to be purely that which can
stand the test of explaining local social reality".
To have a different social science for each and
every "local social reality" would indeed mean
that foreign experience was irrelevant. But that is
not the sort of animal social science isif it were
it would be quite useless. The notion of distinct
national social sciences tailored to distinct local
realities is uncomfortably close to the idea, once
advanced by some anthropologists, that people
living in Africa or New Guinea for residential
or climatic or genetic reasons reacted in a
fundamentally different way to a given set of
stimuli from people of the pinko-grey races! I
am quite sure that Goonatilake has no intention
of saying anything of that sort. But this is where
social-scientific nationalism usually leads. There
is a path from "directing this book to a Third
World readership" and writing with "valuations
clearly those of a Third World writer"2; it
runs through the preparation of work which is
to be read and judged only by the nationals of
one particular country; and it ends up at the
recent policies of President Tombalbaye of Chad.
That path is both uncomfortably short and lined
with the primroses of intellectual applause. Of
course any Western scholar "purporting to guide
towards an inevitable future" the economy of
Sri Lanka or anywhere else, and resting the
inevitability upon "Western development theory
and the work of Western scholars" rather than
on tested social-scientific generalizations, would
be treading a parallel path. Intellectual neo-
colonialism and intellectual isolationism are, to
change the metaphor, opposite sides of the same,
false, coin. It is really all part of the fear of
generalization: not all generalizations are ethno-
centric (Sanskritization again); the ILO Mission's
generalizations reacted very strongly against
'Western development theory' and it is hard to
see what they have to do with dependency.
The problem of cultural encapsulation discussed
by Goontilake raises different issues. lt is true that
universities in some Third World countries, and
planning commissions in many, are isolated from
their economy (in the library of the Agricultural
University of Mymensingh, Bangladesh, there
are few analyses of local problems, but many
books on the care of the dog!). But if Goonati-
lake really thinks that, for instance, MARGA is
turning the attention of Ceylonese away from
their own real problems, he should give examples
2 Backford, Persistent Poverty, pp. vi-vii.
and specify alternative procedures. It is perfectly
true that developing countries' researchers too
often look towards publication in developed
countries' learned journals, and doctorates gained
in foreign universities, rather than towards the
needs of their own countries. But what are
developed countries and their universities sup-
posed to do about this? Ban Third World
students? Prevent the publication of articles from
developing countries in their learned journals?
No; positive initiatives to do things the way they
want them done have to come from the institu-
tions and scholars of the Third World itself. Such
initiatives, to be fruitful, must be positive, not
exclusivePh.D. training of quality at home, not
attacks on ideas because of the nationality of
their holder.
Incidentally, positive academic initiatives have of
course been made in many Third World countries.
The state of Indian economic analysis, empirical
and theoretical, of that country's problems seems
to me far better than in most developed countries,
Western or Communist (the failure of that analy-
sis to get through to he policymakers is another
problem).
The brain drain is really a separate issue. I do
not know why Goonatilake imagines that LDC
people in international organizations or foreign
universities occupy only the 'lower rung,' 'lower
echelons', etc. From Ceylon alone, one could
draw attention to people like Gamani Corea
(hardly in a low echelon in UNCTAD), Lal
Jaywardena, and several others. From the larger
countries of South Asia, there are of course very
many more such people, both in universities and
in international organizations, at very high levels
indeed. It is of course possible that such people
are selected because they are thought likely, by
some insidious international conspiracy, to go
home and form a 'comprador intelligentsia'; but,
thinking of some of the people concerned, I find
it is an unlikely general proposition, though it
may well be true in some cases. Incidentally, a
more self-confident version of Goonatilake's
attitude is that of Dandekar, who argues that
those few scholars who want to 'drain' per-
manently from Indian universities are probably
a good riddance to them. Certainl, the more that
such people 'drain', the smaller is the risk of the
cultural encapsulation that Goonatilake fears.
What, then, is the role of an institution, or group
of academics, in a developed country towards a
less developed country? It is quite true that em-
bassies act to further the interests of their
countries; fortunately, many academic institutions
take their responsibility to scholarship (not
Western social science') more seriously, and most
people at this institute and others will have long
experience of rejecting applicants whose moti-
vation for a visit to a developed country appears
to be the desire to be the victims of intellectual
and cultural rape! Certainly Goonatilake's penul-
timate paragraph should cause him to question
many of his basic presuppositions: the dependency
of past centuries, especially in small poor coun-
tries, has indeed frozen many of their academic
institutions in the backward state that he
describes, and it is this very fact that, dialectically,
enables the intelligentsia of the Third World to
free themselves from their colonial past, by visits
to 'advanced' institutions in the former metro-
polis. Of course this is a very dangerous process
and has to be entered with one's eyes open. But
if, because of European and American social
science 50 years ago, Third World scholars cannot
learn about the inadequacies of the market
mechanism in the subservient institutions of their
own countries (and there is some truth in this
charge), is it not highly desirable for them to go
to the more 'radical' institutions of developed
countries for this sort of insight? And would it
not therefore be quite counter-productive to
adopt the sort of intellectual nationalism implied
by most of Goonatilake's paper?
Finally, a small country has inevitably a limited
number of top-rate intellectuals. The great
majority of scholars and practitioners of social
science, in government as well as universities, are
indeed an intellectual proletariat, testing out and
marginally developing the ideas of their great
predecessors. A Marx or a Keynes is a rare
event, while, at a slightly lower level, first-rate
innovative social scientists are pretty unusual. A
large country like India or the USA might expect,
at any time, to have six or eight if it were lucky.
Sri Lanka or Ghana or Belgium will be lucky if
it has one or two. Many of the problems of Sri
Lanka which Goonatilake attributes to depen-
dency and underdevelopment are in fact the
results of smallness.3 No small country can expect
to have many local scholars who "raise funda-
mental issues of a political nature beyond the
empiricist level", and indeed not many external
missions will do this, though the 1LO Mission
did try; this has much less to do with
dominance-and-dependence than with the in-
3 The creation of numerous and dispersed university institutions
within Sri Lanka, followed by the dilution of standards in
the name of a backward-looking linguistic communalism,
would in these circumstances be a lethal sacrifice of intellec-
tual independence to political convenience.
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tellectual limitations of human beings. "Critical
and bold questioning of and about the social
reality in Sri Lanka" or anywhere else, if it is to
be useful, demands rare qualities of intellectual
independence, imagination and analysis. A small
country is unlikely to 'often produce social
scientists with these qualities. Therefore a Ceylon,
a Sweden, a New Zealand, had better make sure
that plentiful intellectual exchanges, with an
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ideologically diversified range of other countries,
remain possible. lt will have to take steps to
avoid cultural encapsulation or undue influence,
and the best way to do this is to develop its own
high professional standards. 'Professional' means
logical, rigorous, and subject to empirical falsifi-
cation; it emphatically need not mean 'Western',
liberal, capitalist or mono-disciplinary.
